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Abstract. The present paper aims at assessing the possible efficiency of the principle of 
national contributions, assumed in the 2015 Paris Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Strong historical evidence indicates that any significant development of 
constitutional states used to take place, in the past, on the rising tide of demographic 
growth. Presently, we are facing global demographic slowdown, and contesters argue that 
constitutional states are not the right address to write to if we want breakthrough 
technological change. This paper assumes that the capacity of constitutional states to carry 
out the obligations declared in the Framework Convention, i.e. to carry out deep 
technological changes in the global economy, depends on their economic power, which can 
be estimated as their capacity to appropriate capital. Empirical data, examined in this 
article, indicates that since the 1980s, constitutional states have been losing their economic 
power, and that the overall technological progress is more and more disconnected from that 
economic power of governments. Moreover, constitutional states seem to be losing their 
capacity to experiment with their own institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
ecember the 12
th
, 2015, the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
was signed in Paris, under the auspices of United Nations. It marks an 
important step in facing the seemingly biggest challenge for our 
civilisation, namely the passage from fossil fuels to renewable energies, as well as 
the implications of the already happening climate change. The Framework 
Convention is based on the concept of nationally determined contributions, from 
the part of signatory states. Thus, constitutional state seems to be the pivotal 
structure of economic governance as the mankind is facing probably the biggest 
challenge in its history: the climate change. Yet, some contesters argue that the 
constitutional state is not really the best structure for handling significant, 
civilizational challenges (see for example: Heath, (1957); McCallum, (1970); 
Steinberg, Nyman, & Caraccioli, (2011); Friedman, & Taylor, (2010)). A general 
question emerges: will that philosophy of national contributions work as for 
handling the climate change? In other words, are the constitutional states really 
able to endorse the role of dominant social structures in facing that huge 
civilizational challenge that we are facing right now? 
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The most fundamental assumption behind this general question is that at the 
global scale we can talk about the state as a distinct type of social structure, 
different from corporate or cooperative structures. Thus, the actual outcomes of the 
2015 Framework Convention in Climate Changedepend on the general properties 
of that typical structure, and not just on a more or less random, individual 
capacities of each constitutional, national state taken separately. This specific point 
of view is essentially consistent with both the works of Max Weber (1978), and 
with the French historical school. The latter claims that in the European culture, 
significant institutional changes leading to the emergence of the presently known 
constitutional state took place on the rising tide of demographic revivals after 
major demographic slumps, associated with big waves of technological change. 
There were three such big revivals after big depressions (see for example: Braudel, 
(1981); Braudel, (1983). The first one is to notice between 1100 and 1350, and it 
was that mounting flow of population that made the background for the first entity 
recognized as a modern state, namely to the kingdom of Two Sicilies under 
Frederick II (1194-1250). During this period, Europe developed its system of 
agriculture and food supply. That system reached the limits of its capacity about 
1350. Between 1350 and 1450, the European continent experienced a significant 
demographic and economic depression. The trend reversed after 1450, and it was 
the turn of wind power and waterpower to be harnessed with the technology of 
mills. That technological wave was associated with another leap in the institutional 
development of the state: it was precisely when the three monarchs that Francis 
Bacon called „Three Wise Men‟, namely: Henry VII Tudor, Louis XI of France, 
and Ferdinand of Spain, created really modern states, with armies, financial 
systems and distinct administrative structures. After 1650, until about 1750, Europe 
experienced still another demographic depression, and we can notice that the 
pattern of constitutional, republican state that we know today emerged only after 
1750, and its emergence was associated with the development of large – scale 
industry. It is to notice that each of the big technological waves in question 
required an important reallocation of capital. The institutions of the state could be 
possibly an active participant in such reallocation. Some theorists even go to 
claiming that state as an institution mostly developed in order to provide accurate 
protection and robustness to private property rights (see for example: Schlatter, 
1951).  
Currently, we are living a period, which, fault of a better word, can be called 
„global slowdown‟. Some civilizational processes – demographic growth, 
economic growth, urbanization, productivity growth, human mobility, inflation - 
have been developing over many decades, and now, whilst still having some 
momentum, they seem to slow down. Demographic growth of the global 
population, as measured by the World Bank, was of 1,2% in 2014, as compared to 
1,73% in 1990. On the other hand, the global capital stock, estimated currently at 
some 250 quadrillions of constant 2005 US$, grows faster than the global GDP. In 
1950, global capital stock made 2,43 times the global GDP. In 1990, that 
proportion climbed to 2,62 times, and reached 3,32 in 2011. On the other hand, 
aggregate depreciation of the capital stock makes a growing share of the global 
GDP. In 1990, it was 10,59%, and in 2011 that share was of 13,44%. The global 
economy accumulates more and more capital, and compensating the obsolescence 
of the corresponding assets gains in macroeconomic importance. The average, 
national, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), measured in constant prices of 2005, 
stopped growing consistently in the mid 1960s. Since then, the TFP oscillates and 
seems unable to break the ceiling of TFP = 1,07. Currently, it seems to be at around 
1,04, on average, in the global economy. Thus, the prospects for consistently 
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increasing productivity through innovation seem quite vague
1
. The current 
macroeconomic landscape seems disquieting. Economic growth is slow, and likely 
to slow down even more. Deflation, especially in the prices of raw materials and 
fossil resources, becomes a fact. On the whole, more threats than opportunities 
loom at the horizon (IMF, 2015). Some experts say directly that global growth falls 
short of expectations (World Bank, 2016a). According to the World Trade 
Organization, growth in global trade since 2011 through 2014, and in the first half 
of 2015, marked a historical slowdown. Up until 2010, global trade used to grow 
twice as fast as global GDP. Since 2011, that pattern seems to have been broken, 
and trade has been growing at a pace close to that of global output (WTO, 2015). 
Focused studies, conducted by the World Bank, regarding the global outcomes of 
digital technologies, show that the global diffusion of digital technologies is rather 
a somehow sluggish evolution, instead of being the so-called „digital revolution‟. 
Gains from the implementation of digital technologies have been clearly lagging 
behind the dissemination of technologies themselves. The quality of institutions 
that the experts call „analog complements‟ significantly impacts the outcomes of 
digital technologies, and frequently prevents local populations from fully 
exploiting the benefits of information & communication technologies (World 
Bank, 2016b).  
The socio – economic landscape looks very much like the Schumpeterian phase 
of „prolonged depression‟ (Schumpeter, 1939). It is also quite close to the 
hypothetical state of negative return on investment, as described by John Maynard 
Keynes in Chapter 16 of his „General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money‟, entitled „Sundry Observations on the Nature of Capital‟. Keynes argued 
that in such a situation the state should intervene in order to create a new allocation 
of capital. Schumpeter demonstrated, with the example of economic developments 
observable in the 19
th
 century, that governments can successfully leverage 
technological changes, but they have to give away some of the sovereign power to 
the benefit of private business structures (Schumpeter, (1939) op.cit., chapters VI – 
VIII).  
 
2. The theoretical model of the state 
We are a learning species, and we have the capacity to accumulate the outcomes 
of learning from generation to generation, although that accumulation is imperfect 
(see for example: Selten, (1975). As a species, humanity has collective intelligence 
through interaction and experimentation, i.e. it has the capacity to generate new, 
functional patterns of collective behaviour by experimenting with various strategies 
and sharing information about their outcomes. If two armies fight, and one of them 
loses, whilst the other wins, the fact of loss and victory is information, which is 
being share across the society. It serves to organize more efficient armies in the 
future.  When two businesses compete, they display various capacity of acquire 
capital, and to assure a return on it. The very fact of that variety is information, 
which is shared around and serves to optimize future business patterns. Thus, any 
social structure, the mankind as a whole included, has the capacity to adapt to 
natural (i.e. non-social) conditions, and any such structure, government 
included,can be considered as one more step in learning through experimentation. 
Collective learning is a game with imperfect information with the sharing of 
information: each set of institutions is an experiment with finite duration, and the 
outcomes of that experiment feed to another experiment. A sequence of 
 
1 These calculations were made on the grounds of Penn Tables 8.1, as introduced in: Feenstra, Robert 
C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" 
forthcoming in American Economic Review, available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt 
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consecutive moves in the game is needed to work out the given functional 
pattern.Many sequences can be practiced in parallel. The more breakthrough that 
pattern is supposed to be, the greater is the uncertainty as for the number of moves 
in the sequence, and for the number of parallel sequences.  The range of different 
sets of institutions, observable at a given moment, is the measure of 
experimentation taking place. The more different institutional patterns are there at 
the same moment, the more intensethe experimentation is. The greater intensity of 
experimentation at a given moment, the greater is the likelihood of working out 
new functional patterns in a given time.  
Institutions can do only what people actually do. Institutions rely on legal rules, 
combined with other types of social norms. All of these, in turn, come out from a 
linguistically logical grasp of reality (Hodgson, 1993; 2000; 2006; Searle, (2005). 
Consistently with Herbert Hart‟s theory of law (Hart, 1961), and with Talcott 
Parsons‟ sociological theory (Parsons et al., 1965), social norms are 
institutionalized patterns of behaviour, that manifest themselves in social strategies 
formed and used by individuals and social groups, in a context of imperfect 
information (see for example: Harsanyi 1953; 1966; 1967; 1968).  
Constitutional states are able to do things that they are allowed to do, and have 
the material means to carry out. Thus, we are talking about equilibrium between 
legitimation and economic power, in the government. Institutions emerge in a 
discursive process of legitimation for the given pattern of political action (see for 
example: Habermas, 1975; 1979; 1996; Fraser, 1990). The political system itself 
has two speeds. On the one hand, political action provides for the interests of major 
social groups represented through current modification of institutions, and in that 
process the government appropriates capital in order to carry out the actual public 
mission (see for example: Weingast et al. 1981; Weingast, 1995). The capital 
possible to appropriate by the state may be considered as a rough equivalent of 
territory, with respect to Max Weber‟s theory (see for example: Weingast, 1981). 
On the other hand, the political system itself has significant inertia, as distinct 
political players in the system have to agree for the action to take (see for example: 
Tsebelis, 2002). Hence, institutions adapt imperfectly to their socio-economic and 
natural context (Andersen, 2004; Aoki, 2007).  
Any constitutional state in place can be described with two types of rational 
variables, pertaining to the two fundamental functions of the state, namely 
appropriation of capital and creation of public goods. The former can be estimated 
with the proportion between public expenditures, and the available capital stock, 
and the latter, consistently with Braudel (1983) can find an expression in the 
proportion between demographic growth and the growth of public expenditures. 
Additionally, in the initially introduced context of this article (coping with climate 
change), measures of correlation between technological progress and public 
expenditures can be introduced as indirect indicators of public goods created by 
state. The temporarily expected values of those indicators (e.g. averages), in a 
cross-sectional approach, set the central trend of change in the economic role of the 
state. The temporary dispersion (e.g. variance, distance between quartiles‟ frontiers 
etc.) in the same variables can help to estimate the temporary diversity, hence the 
intensity of experimentation with public governance.    
 
3. Empirical insight– the general landscape 
The well-known statistical database of Penn Tables, in their 8.x generation, 
recently returned to measuring national capital stocks (see: Feenstra, Inklaar, & 
Timmer, 2015). That great source of information, covering a relatively long period, 
since 1950, seems appropriate to sketch the empirical landscape for this article. 
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Graph 1, in the Appendix, shows the trends of indexed values in two variables:the 
total capital stock in the global economy, and the total public expenditures. The 
correlation seems almost perfect up until 2002, when the global capital stock seems 
to gather value visibly faster than global public expenditures. On the other hand, 
both aggregates can be compared to each other, i.e. public expenditures can be 
computed as a share of the capital stock. Graph 2 (Appendix) shows the 1950-2011 
trend of that ratio, in two alternative versions: aggregate and distributive average. 
Both measures seem to be strongly correlated and follow the same trends, with 
three distinct periods. From 1950 to the mid-1970s, governments appropriate a 
growing share of the capital stock accumulated. That period roughly corresponds to 
the widespread tendency to apply Keynesian economic policy in the developed 
economies. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, a short saddle is visible: 
the public sector first recedes, then advances. These are the first years of fashion 
for monetarism in economic policy. After 1985, when the so-called NCM model of 
economic governance starts to take root, the trend is clearly descending: the capital 
stock accumulates much faster than public sectors grow (see: Taylor, 2011).   
It is interesting to descend at the level of cross-sectional comparison between 
countries, and Table 2 (Appendix) shows the average national ratios over 1950-
2011. A pattern clearly comes out: the wealthier the country, and the bigger its 
economy, the lower that average, national ratio. The share of public expenditures in 
the national capital stock seems to target some kind of ceiling value, and not going 
above it. In other words, the public sector can appropriate a part of the total capital 
stock up to a point, and past that point capital accumulates in the private sector 
much faster than in the public one. It seems to be a case of target fiscal stance, 
according to the general concept formulated by Roubini & Sachs (1989). Formal 
econometric analysis in the data panel consisting of Penn Tables 8_1 yields allows 
a multiple, linear regression, explaining the share of public expenditures in the 
national capital stock with three input variables: GDP per capita, total GDP, and 
population (See Table 1, Appendix). With N = 8278 observations, that regression 
yields a linear equation with pretty good econometric fit (R
2
 = 0,465, all 
coefficients significant at p < 0,001). The relative size of the national economy as 
measured by the GDP seems to discourage the appropriation of capital by the 
public sector. The bigger grows the output of the economy; the lower descends the 
appropriation of capital by the government.  On the other hand, the demographic 
size of the country, and its relative wealth measured with GDP per capita both push 
the public appropriation of capital upwards.  
Graph 3 (Appendix) shows the relative dispersion in the ratio of public 
expenditures to the national capital stock, as the spread between the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 
percentile, from 1950 through 2011. Between 1950 and 1976, the spread had been 
growing sharply: there had been more and more experimentation as for the actual 
capacity of governments to appropriate capital. After 1976, the trend reversed, and 
since then dispersion has been decreasing, which suggests a lowering tendency to 
experimentation. 
A pattern emerges: the observable growth or decline in public appropriation of 
capital is clearly correlated with the degree of experimentation with said 
appropriation. In that process of experimenting, countries from the upper 
percentiles visibly hit a ceiling, and bounced back. That ceiling seems to have been 
situated somewhere between 18% and 20% of the national capital stock „vacuum 
cleaned‟ through public budgets, or, in terms of cross-sectional distribution, 
somewhere around 1,4 percentage point above the least appropriating governments.     
The most fundamental demographic change is the change in size. Hence, the 
next step in our investigation is the basic comparison of trends in, respectively, 
population and aggregate public expenditures at the global scale. Graph 4 
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(Appendix) shows those trends as 1990-based indexed values, on the grounds of 
Penn Tables 8.1. From 1950 until the mid-1990s those two indexes had been 
following a very similar trajectory. After 1996, global public expenditures started 
to grow significantly faster. Graph 5 (Appendix) gives an idea of dispersion public 
expenditures per capita, as measured in constant 2005 US$. Three periods can be 
distinguished. From 1950 to 1978, the spread between the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percentile 
of that variable had been quickly growing, up to some 15 000 constant 2005 US$. 
After 1978, through 2006, a period of quick changes in dispersion followed, as if 
some governments had recurrently attempted to break some kind of frontier, with 
changing success. After 2006, dispersion restarted to increase.    
One measure has been chosen in the present article to appraise the overall 
technological progress of humanity: agricultural productivity. Innovation is 
commonly associated with the most advanced technologies, and agriculture does 
not really fit the bill. Yet, as we study the diffusion of innovation as a process of 
spill-over, from the most advanced fields of technology, down to the most day to 
day activities, agriculture is somewhere at the bottom of that fountain of new ideas. 
Farming is tough, and it requires all the necessary skills and resources to be 
grouped in one place, i.e. at the farm. When technological advances arrive to the 
agricultural sector, they must have been preliminarily, fully absorbed in the social 
structure. Agricultural productivity encompasses energy use as well, or, in other 
words, the ability to save energy. Agriculture consumes energy, both directly, and 
indirectly, in the form of fossil fuels, electricity, and embodied in intermediate 
goods. Agriculture yields rather a low value added, and every penny counts when it 
comes to counting the costs. Saving energy is important to any farmer. Thus, 
agricultural productivity is a measure of energy efficiency in human activities, as 
well. Graph 6, in the Appendix, shows the previously introduced share of global 
public expenditures in the global capital stock, against the trend in cereal yield 
(kg/ha), as published by the World Bank. Both measures are shown as trends 
indexed on the constant basis of 1990 values. Up until the early 1990s, those trends 
seem to have been strongly correlated. Since then, the correlation has broken, and 
agricultural productivity has been growing despite the shrinking participation of the 
public sector in the available capital stock. Graph 7, in the Appendix, completes the 
picture by showing the relative dispersion over time, in agricultural productivity, as 
the spread between the 4
th
 and the 1
st
 quartile. Interestingly, up until 2006 that 
spread had been increasing very gently: the most productive countries were quite 
close to the least productive ones. After 2006, some kind of technological 
revolution took place, and the upper quartile rocketed up, leaving far behind the 
followers.   
The economic role of constitutional states has certainly evolved. It is interesting 
to put that economic change against the background of political institutions. In that 
respect, the Database of Political Institutions, (DPI), as published by the World 
Bank (Beck et al., 2001; Keefer, 2012) provides some interesting observations as 
for the intriguing period since 1975. Following Tsebelis (2002 op. cit.) it is 
assumed that political systems have two intertwined structures: the constitutional, 
and the partisan one. At the strictly constitutional level, the DPI distinguishes three 
basic systems: parliamentary, presidential, and those with assembly – elected 
presidents. In the same constitutional perspective, the DPI provides two variables, 
namely „LIEC‟ and „EIEC‟, which are rough estimates as for the degree of 
democracy in the appointment of respectively the legislative, and the executive 
bodies. The higher the value of „LIEC‟ or „EIEC‟ index, on a scale from 1 to 7, the 
greater the probability that democratic standards are respected. Since 1975, the DPI 
displays a growing average value in both indexes, and a decreasing variance. As 
rough as the sketch is, constitutional states seem to have been becoming 
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consistently more and more democratic, and the degree of experimentation in that 
respect clearly declined. The „POLARIZ‟ variable in the DPI shows the degree of 
partisan polarization in political systems, with respect to economic policy. The 
scale of polarization is highly discreet, ranging from „0‟ (no observable 
polarization), through „1‟ (moderate), to „2‟ (high). It is to notice, in the first place 
that the „0s‟ keep on prevailing in the DPI. Most political systems in the world, 
currently 109 out of the 145 reported, display no substantial partisan divergence in 
the matters of economic policy. Yet, since 1975, the share of „1s‟ and „2s‟ has 
increased. As astounding as it could seem, most flamboyant debates about 
economic policy, observable in national assemblies and the media, most frequently 
boil down to quite amorphous economic programs.   
It is interesting to confront the data about political institutions with the 
relatively current fiscal developments, asreported by the International Monetary 
Fund in its World Economic Outlook database (WEO), as published in April 2015. 
The DPI and the WEO put together cover the period between 1980 and 2012, and 
allow an interesting insight into current the typical fiscal stance in typical political 
frames. In order to represent the basic constitutional structure of political systems, 
two variables have been selected in the rich structure of the Database of Political 
Systems. The first is the type of political system according to the presence and 
powers of the president, coded in the DPI as „system‟. The second is the type of 
electoral competitiveness in parliamentary elections, covered by the variables 
„plurality‟, and „proportionality‟ in the DPI.  
The distinction between presidential systems, and the parliamentary ones takes 
into account two main categories of veto players: institutional, and partisan. In 
other words, veto players can emerge and change their relative impact upon the 
system following to patterns: the regulatory, constitutional definition of their role, 
and the discretionary freedom of political action offered by that role. In presidential 
systems, the president is a strong veto player, and tends to concentrate power in 
their hands. Conversely, parliamentary systems are based on diversified and 
dispersed political power, without that one central veto player in the presidential 
seat. Systems with assembly – elected presidents are an interesting hybrid of the 
two, probably prone to balance towards the concentration, or the dispersion of 
political power, following the personal talents of the president in place.   
The general assumption is that regimes with a strong component of electoral 
plurality favour “winner-takes-it-all” elections. This, in turn, promotes the interests 
of big, strong political parties, making them strong veto players, and reduces the 
veto playing positions of small parties. In other words, plural electoral regimes tend 
to reduce the overall number of partisan veto players, but they confer important 
impact to the players who manage to enter the scene. On the other hand, 
proportionality in elections allows a broader representation of small political 
parties and non-partisan representatives in the legislative body. That creates more 
veto players with more disparate political power.  
As for the partisan structure of the political system, the most general variable in 
the DPI seems to be political polarization, already mentioned. The detailed 
composition of the sample of observations studied is given in the Appendix (Table 
3). Just as in the full contents of the DPI, the sample studied is dominated by three 
big clusters: plural electoral regimes in presidential systems with no observable 
polarization (N = 233 observations), plural electoral regimes in parliamentary 
systems, with no observable polarization as well (N = 205), and strongly polarized, 
parliamentary systems with proportional elections (N = 213). This clustering 
suggests that plural electoral regimes favour the formation of partisan structures 
around groups of interest rather that around ideological stances. That appears as a 
logical consequence of the “winner-takes-it-all” principle in plural elections, which 
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favours big electoral funds and robust campaigns, and clearly discourages 
ideological discords. An interesting pattern emerges: national political systems tend 
to stay quite firmly within one pattern of constitutional order, over the period of 
observation, yet they frequently move between various cases of partisan 
polarization.  
The next step of empirical investigation was to follow the disparities of typical 
fiscal aggregates across political systems. Fiscal aggregates have been divided into 
two categories, namely current and capital, following the basic intuitions of the 
present research. The structural fiscal balance, gross public revenues, and gross 
public expenditures are classified as current aggregates, i.e. rather flows than 
balances. Conversely, gross and net public debt is considered as capital measures 
(balances rather than flows). The differential between gross and net debt, namely 
the amount of financial assets held by the public sector, is included in this category 
too
2
.   
As for gross public revenues, parliamentary systems are clearly tax-greedier 
than the presidential ones (Table 4, Appendix). They also seem much more 
sensitive to political polarization: any increase in that respect is connected to 
significantly higher public revenues. Gross public expenditures follow a similar 
pattern, and yet, within each constitutional order, they seem much more sensitive 
than revenues to shifts in political polarization. The observation of structural fiscal 
balances seems to indicate that the shift from no observable polarization to 
moderate one has more impact than a further deepening of polarization from 
moderate to high.  
Variables referring to capital accruals in the public sector display a significantly 
greater disparity across political systems than current flows do. In other words, the 
empirically observable differences between political systems as for their patterns of 
capital appropriation are noticeably more pronounced than differences referring to 
current fiscal management (Table 5, Appendix).  
Following the observable clustering of political systems in the sample studied, 
three “big” types are defined for the purposes of further empirical investigation. 
They are: 
a) Cluster #1: Presidential systems with plural elections, and no observable 
political polarization: structural balance -2,651% of GDP, gross public 
indebtedness 55,186% of the GDP, financial assets held by the public sector 9,151% 
of the GDP  
b) Cluster #2: Parliamentary systems with plural elections, and no observable 
political polarization: structural balance -3,643% of GDP, gross public 
indebtedness 70,739% of the GDP, financial assets held by the public sector 23,165% 
of the GDP 
c) Cluster #3: Parliamentary systems with proportional elections and high 
political polarization: structural balance -3,089% of GDP, gross public 
indebtedness 62,025% of the GDP, financial assets held by the public sector 46,771% 
of the GDP     
The definition of those 3 clusters shows even more sharply the explanatory 
power of capital appropriation as a characteristic of political systems. The 
interesting, general observation is that cluster #1, which hosts the least veto players 
in the system, seems to be the most frugal in fiscal terms, both with respect to 
 
2The author is aware of the conceptual risk connected to that variable. Those financial assets include, 
for a large part, those held by central banks as monetary reserves. Thus, this could be a monetary 
variable rather that a fiscal one. Yet, the amount of those financial assets in public hands is not 
exclusively monetary, in the first place, and, secondly, it impacts significantly the fiscal, borrowing 
capacity of the government. Hence, this is a variable at the fringe of fiscal policy, and the rest of the 
economy.  
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current fiscal management, and to capital appropriation. Any shift from this cluster, 
thus any addition of veto players, through constitutional rules or partisan 
polarization, is clearly associated to more profusion in fiscal stances. Considering 
constitutional and partisan distinctions as an overall indicator of the number of veto 
players in the system, we can roughly consider clusters #1, and #3 as the opposite 
poles of the scale, with cluster #2 found somewhere in the middle. Cluster #1 has 
probably the least veto players, cluster #3 has the most of them, and cluster #2 is a 
medium case. Following this intuition, the presence of more veto players in the 
political system is associated most of all to a much greater tendency of the public 
sector to accumulate liquid financial assets. 
 
4. Final discussion 
The most general conclusion coming from the empirical investigation is that 
constitutional states, as a distinct category of social structures, are becoming 
simpler and more recurrent in their internal, political mechanics. Constitutional 
states do not really experiment a lot with themselves. It seems that whole societies 
clearly prefer bespoke to tailor made, as political systems come. We the humans 
clearly prefer well-rounded, ready-made patterns of collective organisation to 
uncertain outcomes of experimentation. It had not always been so. Between 1950 
and 1980, constitutional states seem to have gone through a period of intense 
experimentation, chiefly on the tide of decolonisation and development of 
international organisations. Observation of long term trends suggest that it was 
precisely that period of intense experimentation that brought a temporary 
expansion of constitutional states in their economic power, thus in their capacity to 
implement any significant technological progress. When political experimentation 
started to turn into increased repetition of already known patterns, constitutional 
states progressively lost their grip upon the capital stock available. The relative 
position of national governments as economic players, vis a vis other types of 
social agents, seems to have settled as much weaker than in the 1990. 
Constitutional states, as a distinct category of social structures, are generally 
successful as guarantors as for the enforceability of claims and property rights. Yet, 
the same constitutional states generally failed to accumulate substantial capital on 
their own account. With rare exceptions of important state owned assets (e.g. 
Canada, Russia, Finland etc.), most governments can only achieve temporary 
retention of capital through a pattern of governance known as „budgetary slack‟ 
(see for example: Goldman, & Brashares, 1991). For the last two decades, capital 
seems to accumulate chiefly outside the public sector. National economies 
experiment less and less, too, with the capacity of the state to appropriate capital. 
On the other hand, experimentation does go on as for the correspondence between 
public expenditures and population. Global public expenditures are growing faster 
than the number of people to spend money on, and that discrepancy is to notice 
since the 1990s. Public expenditures per capita, computed at the national level, 
display a growing cross-sectional dispersion. Some countries still attempt at 
maintaining the welfare state, but those attempts are becoming more and more 
isolated in comparison to the global average.  
Constitutional states are progressively becoming superfluous in promoting 
technological progress. The latter seems to follow logically from the former: public 
expenditures disconnect from technological progress because there is more and 
more capital available outside the budgetary cycle of governments.  
The state, as a type of social structure, develops on a rising tide of demographic 
growth. At first, in that process, public institutions are really functional regarding 
the needs of the growing population. Yet, the appropriation of capital by public 
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agents progressively becomes autonomous regarding the strictly spoken 
demographic needs. The phenomenon of „pervasive state‟ appears: appropriation of 
capital by public agents starts to be dysfunctional and self-propelled. The state 
progressively stops to redistribute capital, and starts creating undistributed pockets 
of capital with uncertain property rights, subject to discretionary power of 
politicians. Marginal productivity of capital suffers, probably because of the rising 
inflation and growing uncertainty as for the interest rates.  
The state, as a functional social structure, builds up to a point, mostly 
determined by demographic factors. Past that point, the frontier between the state 
and the private sector becomes foggy. Institutions build up at the frontier between 
the public and the private, and they accumulate capital characterized by uncertain 
property rights. Those institutions become dysfunctional, as they de facto divert 
capital from both productive employment and social redistribution. This is the 
intuition expressed by many economists regarding the accumulation of public debt 
(see for example: Meade, 1958; Modigliani, 1961; Diamond, 1965). A point comes 
when the dysfunction of those foggy public institutions becomes so pronounced 
that the state loses its capacity to appropriate capital, and de facto backs off as a 
social agent.   
Now, let‟s return to the initial question of this article: are constitutional states 
able to assure the pivotal role in driving the mankind through the perils of climate 
change, as it is assumed in the Paris Framework Climate Agreement, 2015? The 
answer is: probably not, at least not now. Of course, constitutional states are able to 
experiment with themselves. Both the historical accounts, and the more recent 
trends prove that. Yet, the latest wave of experimentation, from the 1950s through 
the 1980s, required a prerequisite of two consecutive world wars. Constitutional 
states seem to be institutionally rigid, once they have settled into some precise 
form.    
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Appendix 
 
Table1. 
Explained variable: ln(1 + share of public expenditures in the national capital stock), linear OLS regression 
N = 8278 
R2 = 0,465 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value 
ln(1+ GDP per capita) 0,089 0,004 23,159 0,000 
ln(1+ GDP) -0,084 0,004 -20,092 0,000 
ln(1+population) 0,101 0,005 20,057 0,000 
Source: author‟s, on the grounds of data from Penn Tables 8.1.,Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1.  
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
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Source: Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
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Table2.  
country Average share of 
public expenditures 
in the national 
capital stock over 
1950 - 2011 
country Average share of 
public expenditures 
in the national 
capital stock over 
1950 - 2011 
country Average share of public 
expenditures in the 
national capital stock 
over 1950 - 2011 
Albania 5,9% Finland 4,6% Oman 10,3% 
Angola 17,9% France 5,9% Pakistan 10,4% 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
38,9% Gabon 7,6% Panama 11,0% 
Argentina 4,0% Gambia 15,9% Paraguay 9,7% 
Armenia 8,1% Georgia 11,5% Peru 8,2% 
Australia 3,9% Germany 4,6% Philippines 8,7% 
Austria 7,0% Ghana 4,4% Poland 9,5% 
Azerbaijan 11,3% Greece 4,6% Portugal 5,9% 
Bahamas 12,1% Grenada 31,1% Qatar 10,0% 
Bahrain 8,8% Guatemala 9,9% Republic of Korea 5,8% 
Bangladesh 6,9% Guinea 8,5% Republic of Moldova 7,3% 
Barbados 13,5% Guinea-Bissau 5,7% Romania 11,0% 
Belarus 7,8% Honduras 7,3% Russian Federation 6,3% 
Belgium 5,6% Hungary 10,4% Rwanda 49,4% 
Belize 39,9% Iceland 4,9% Saint Kitts and Nevis 16,3% 
Benin 25,2% India 8,2% Saint Lucia 37,7% 
Bermuda 29,1% Indonesia 8,4% Sao Tome and Principe 7,5% 
Bhutan 8,2% Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 
5,9% Saudi Arabia 5,8% 
Bolivia 8,9% Iraq 10,4% Senegal 11,6% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
16,0% Ireland 7,2% Serbia 7,1% 
Botswana 14,4% Israel 16,6% Sierra Leone 59,7% 
Brazil 6,4% Italy 5,1% Singapore 6,1% 
Brunei Darussalam 10,5% Jamaica 8,0% Slovakia 9,4% 
Bulgaria 11,5% Japan 7,8% Slovenia 6,2% 
Burkina Faso 12,1% Jordan 29,4% South Africa 8,0% 
Burundi 9,8% Kazakhstan 6,7% Spain 5,0% 
Cambodia 4,9% Kenya 11,3% Sri Lanka 14,9% 
Cameroon 13,0% Kuwait 9,4% St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
44,4% 
Canada 5,4% Kyrgyzstan 14,3% Sudan 21,8% 
Cape Verde 4,7% Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
10,1% Suriname 8,2% 
Central African 
Republic 
6,9% Latvia 10,2% Swaziland 13,8% 
Chad 100,1% Lebanon 6,2% Sweden 9,4% 
Chile 11,7% Lesotho 9,5% Switzerland 2,4% 
China, People's 
Republic of 
14,1% Liberia 4,9% Syrian Arab Republic 16,6% 
China: Hong Kong 
SAR 
2,9% Lithuania 14,8% Taiwan 22,4% 
China: Macao SAR 4,6% Luxembourg 4,4% Tajikistan 10,7% 
Colombia 3,6% Madagascar 16,9% Thailand 7,6% 
Comoros 12,9% Malawi 7,6% The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
9,6% 
Congo 31,2% Malaysia 5,8% Togo 8,4% 
Costa Rica 11,1% Maldives 16,9% Trinidad and Tobago 10,5% 
Croatia 7,1% Mali 29,0% Tunisia 13,5% 
Cyprus 3,3% Malta 9,7% Turkey 5,3% 
Czech Republic 8,7% Mauritania 12,7% Turkmenistan 7,9% 
Côte d'Ivoire 16,2% Mauritius 15,0% Uganda 14,0% 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
5,0% Mexico 4,3% Ukraine 4,8% 
Denmark 6,5% Mongolia 12,2% United Kingdom 7,6% 
Djibouti 16,4% Montenegro 10,2% United Republic of 
Tanzania: Mainland 
26,5% 
Dominica 91,9% Morocco 18,5% United States 4,6% 
Dominican Republic 7,6% Mozambique 5,4% Uruguay 9,1% 
Ecuador 7,7% Namibia 9,2% Uzbekistan 35,0% 
Egypt 69,9% Nepal 17,5% Venezuela 8,4% 
El Salvador 25,1% Netherlands 6,4% Viet Nam 13,9% 
Equatorial Guinea 82,0% New Zealand 7,4% Yemen 38,0% 
Estonia 12,1% Niger 6,2% Zambia 24,2% 
Ethiopia 19,9% Nigeria 14,1% Zimbabwe 42,8% 
Fiji 13,0% Norway 5,8%   
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
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Graph 3.  
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
 
 
Graph 4.  
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
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Source: Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
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Graph 6.  
Source: Penn Tables 8.1. Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015), World Bank Database of Social 
Development Indicators 
 
 
 
Graph 7.  
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015), World Bank Database of Social Development Indicators 
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Table 3. 
 Political system 
Electoral 
regime 
Presidential Assembly – 
Elected 
President 
Parliamentary 
Plural 
elections 
POLARIZ = 0 
N = 233 
Bahrain 2003 – 2012; Bolivia 2006 – 
2012; Chile 2002 – 2009; Egypt 2006 
– 2011; Ghana 2005 – 2001; Islamic 
Republic of Iran 1996 – 2012; Jordan 
1990 – 2009; Kazakhstan 2009 – 2007; 
Kenya 1998 – 2007; Korea 2005 – 
2012; Lithuania 2000, 2004; Malawi 
2005 – 2012; Maldives 1997 – 2009; 
Mali 2000 – 2002; Mexico 1998 – 
2000; Morocco 1996 – 2012; Nigeria 
2000 – 2012; Pakistan 2003 – 2008; 
Panama 2003 – 2012; Poland 1998 - 
2007; Swaziland 2007 – 2012; Syria 
1990 – 2010; United States 2001 – 
2010; Yemen 2000 – 2012; Zambia 
2005 – 2011 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
N = 35 
Bolivia 2003 – 2005; Brazil 2007 – 
2012; Chile 1993, 2010 – 2012; Korea 
2001 – 2004; Mexico 2001 – 2006, 
2010 – 2012; Niger 1995, 1996; 
Poland 2011 – 2012; Ukraine 1998 – 
99, 2000 – 2002 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
N = 33 
Bolivia 2000 – 2002; Brazil 2000 – 
2006; Chile 1994 – 2001; Ghana 2001 
– 2004; Maldives 2010 – 2012; 
Mexico 2007 – 2009; Poland 2008 – 
2010; United States 2011, 2012 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
N = 25 
Egypt 2004 – 
2005; Greece 
1980 – 1986; 
Lebanon 2000 – 
2012; Yemen 
1999 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
No records 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
N = 4 
Pakistan 2009 - 
2012 
POLARIZ = 0 
N = 205 
Australia 1989 – 2010; Belize 2002 – 2012; 
Canada 1981 – 2004, 2012; Ethiopia 1996 – 2000, 
2006 – 2012; Fiji 2000 – 2001; France 1983 – 
1986, 2003 – 2012; Greece 1987 – 1999; Hungary 
2007 – 2012; Italy 1995 – 96, 2002 – 2008; Japan 
1981 – 83, 1987 – 2012; Lesotho 2000 – 2002, 
2008 – 2012; New Zealand 1985 – 1994; Spain 
1985 – 93, 2001 – 2004, 2012; Trinidad and 
Tobago 2001 – 2012; United Kingdom 1980 – 
2010;  
 
POLARIZ = 1 
N = 12 
Hungary 2005 – 06; Italy 1994 , 1997 – 2001; 
Latvia 2007 – 2010 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
N = 104 
Australia 1999 – 2012; Canada 1980, 2005 – 2011; 
France 1987 – 2002; Germany 1991 – 2012; 
Greece 1993; Italy 2009 – 2012; Japan 1980, 1984 
– 86, 1994 – 96; New Zealand 1995 – 2012; 1994 
– 2011; Trinidad and Tobago 2000; United 
Kingdom 2011 - 2012 
Proportional 
elections 
POLARIZ = 0 
N = 59 
Algeria 2003 – 2007; Cape Verde 
2002 – 2011; Kazakhstan 2008 – 2012; 
Liberia 2000 – 2003; Namibia 2006 – 
2012; Niger 2010 – 2011; Peru 2000 – 
2012; Poland 1998 – 2006; Ukraine 
2011 – 2012; Uruguay 2005 – 2012 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
N = 17 
Algeria 2001, 2002, 2008 – 2012; 
Cape Verde 2012; Israel 2001; Peru 
2001 – 2006; Poland 1996 – 97 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
N = 7 
Colombia 1999 – 2002; Israel 2000; 
Uruguay 2003 - 2004 
POLARIZ = 0 
N = 25 
Bulgaria 2000 – 
2001; Estonia 
1996 – 1999; 
Guyana 2007 – 
2012; South 
Africa 2000 – 
2012; 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
No records 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
N = 2 
Estonia 2000 - 
2001 
POLARIZ = 0 
N = 29 
Bulgaria 2010 – 2012; Ireland 1980 – 81, 2007; 
FYR Macedonia 2003 – 2011; Portugal 2006 – 
2009; Turkey 2003 – 2012 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
N = 62 
Finland 1991 – 95, 2003 - 2011; Iceland 1988 – 
91, 2000 – 2007; Ireland 1988 – 94, 1998 - 2012; 
Israel 2002 – 2003; Italy 1988 – 1993; Latvia 2000 
– 2006 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
N = 213 
Austria 1988 – 2012; Belgium 1980 – 2012; 
Denmark 1995 – 2012; Finland 1980 – 90, 1996 – 
2002, 2012; Iceland 1982 – 99, 2008 – 09; Ireland 
1982 – 87, 1995 – 97; Israel 2004 – 2012; 
Netherlands 1995 – 2012; Norway 1980 – 2012; 
Portugal 1997 – 2012; Sweden 1993 – 2012; 
Turkey 2002 
 
Source: Database of Political Institutions 
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Table 4. Average values of current fiscal aggregates, % of the GDP 
Gross public revenues 
 Political system 
Electoral regime Presidential Assembly – Elected 
President 
Parliamentary 
Plural elections POLARIZ = 0 
26,827 
 
POLARIZ =1 
26,918 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
26,736 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
24,471 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
13,579 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
36,904 
 
POLARIZ =1 
41,829 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
40,563 
 
Proportional elections POLARIZ = 0 
29,308 
 
POLARIZ =1 
31,545 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
28,757 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
29,818 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
35,298 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
34,338 
 
POLARIZ =1 
42,733 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
48,972 
 
Gross public expenditures 
 Political system 
Electoral regime Presidential Assembly – Elected 
President 
Parliamentary 
Plural elections POLARIZ = 0 
29,052 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
28,707 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
30,884 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
34,103 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
20,113 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
40,072 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
46,832 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
42,453 
 
Proportional elections POLARIZ = 0 
30,156 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
33,067 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
32,029 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
31,55 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
34,134 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
37,476 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
45,796 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
49,926 
 
Structural fiscal balance 
 Political system 
Electoral regime Presidential Assembly – Elected 
President 
Parliamentary 
Plural elections POLARIZ = 0 
     -2,651 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
-2,155 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
-4,247 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
-16,676 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
n.a. 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
-3,643 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
-4,305 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
-1,726 
 
Proportional elections POLARIZ = 0 
-1,913 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
-2,676 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
-2,036 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
-2,607 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
n.a. 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
-4,108 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
-3,159 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
-3,089 
 
Source: Author‟s 
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Table 5. Average values of capital fiscal aggregates, % of the GDP 
Gross public debt 
 Political system 
Electoral regime Presidential Assembly – Elected 
President 
Parliamentary 
Plural elections POLARIZ = 0 
55,186 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
48,927 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
55,383 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
112,071 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
60,978 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
70,739 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
75,684 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
53,648 
 
Proportional elections POLARIZ = 0 
90,934 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
39,432 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
63,105 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
40,553 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
4,954 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
42,491 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
53,612 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
62,025 
 
Net public debt 
 Political system 
Electoral regime Presidential Assembly – Elected 
President 
Parliamentary 
Plural elections POLARIZ = 0 
46,036 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
31,829 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
41,441 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
47,574 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
65,77 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
35,039 
 
Proportional elections POLARIZ = 0 
70,994 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
18,32 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
56,36 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
34,581 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
18,165 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
15,254 
 
Financial assets held by the government (gross debt minus net debt) 
 Political system 
Electoral regime Presidential Assembly – Elected 
President 
Parliamentary 
Plural elections POLARIZ = 0 
9,151 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
17,098 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
13,942 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
23,165 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
9,915 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
18,609 
 
Proportional elections POLARIZ = 0 
19,94 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
21,112 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
6,745 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
 
 
POLARIZ = 0 
7,91 
 
POLARIZ = 1 
35,447 
 
POLARIZ = 2 
46,771 
 
Source: Author‟s  
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